General Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander of Coalition forces in the Gulf War, summarized the Iraqi offensive at Khafji as \"about as significant as a mosquito on an elephant.\" In subsequent years, Gulf War analysts have increased their focus on Khafji, arguing that this relatively minor engagement had significant strategic implications for the Gulf War as well as future conflicts. In particular, airpower advocates increasingly refer to Khafji as the example of airpower's emerging role in halting armored offenses, a traditional Army mission. What really happened at Khafji? Did this three-day battle signify a shift toward the pre-eminence of airpower over land warfare? Are those citing Khafji as evidence of airpower's new role in joint warfare reaching too far? Did airpower alone halt a significant Iraqi attack into Saudi Arabia? This study examines the available unclassified evidence to determine the tactical and operational effects of airpower at Khafji. First, it first addresses the Iraqis' intentions at Khafji, presuming that no accurate judgement of Coalition effectiveness can be determined independently of what the Iraqis were trying to achieve. | Airpower And The Battle Of Khafji by John F Newell, Paperback | Indigo Chapters