The People’s Republic of China has engaged in military coercion or grey-zone wars with several major powers and neighbours since 1949. Portraying itself always as the victim of aggression, it holds adversaries responsible for provoking conflict by trampling on China’s national security and, thus, compelling it to retaliate in self defence. Its ability to achieve political objectives even with more powerful adversaries while absolving itself of blame and justifying the use of force, makes it formidable to deal with. This book explores the complex factors that shape China’s decisions to deploy force by delving into its politics, diplomacy and military thinking, as well as the tools that it uses to craft favourable narratives, through specific case-studies from the 1950s till current times. It is intended to uncover the politics and diplomacy behind China’s coercive behaviour and to identify possible patterns in their decision-making process that might be useful to practitioners, strategists or researchers who study why and when China might, in the future, engage in military coercion or conflict.