In December 1995, the Dayton Peace Accords led to a US Army deployment to Bosnia for participation in a complex, multinational peace enforcement operation, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. Four heavy and one light divisions have served as the nucleus of Task Force Eagle, the US contingent of the Implementation Force (IFOR) and, later, the Stabilization Force (SFOR). This monograph examines the heavy division intelligence system in light of the experiences in Bosnia to assess its ability to support peace enforcement operations. It sets the stage for this examination by establishing the intelligence environment, identifying the differences between intelligence to support combat operations and intelligence to support sustained peace enforcement operations. It also addresses the specific intelligence requirements that resulted from the particular mission in Bosnia. With this background, the monograph examines the heavy division's intelligence system, assessing the utility of its equipment and its organization in peace enforcement operations. The result is an identification of the deficiencies in the division intelligence system and the required adaptation and augmentation for peace enforcement operations. The heavy division intelligence system currently has all source capabilities, and the planned replacements for legacy systems promise greater capabilities in more efficient systems. Division equipment complements the force projection expectation of US Army forces, and Bosnia showcased the division level intelligence system's ability to employ the principles of split-based operations, broadcast intelligence, and tactical tailoring. Nevertheless, tactical MI continues to be plagued with inadequate legacy systems and with an inadequate HUMINT capability. Without significant augmentation, the tactical force is not organically equipped to provide the intelligence support required in peace enforcement operations. The heavy divisions that served as the nucleus of TFE required consi