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Public Procurement in the European Union: How Contracting Authorities Can Improve Their Procurement Performance in Tende: How Contracting Authorities Can Improve Their Procurement Performance in Tenders
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Public Procurement in the European Union: How Contracting Authorities Can Improve Their Procurement Performance in Tende: How Contracting Authorities Can Improve Their Procurement Performance in Tenders in Ottawa, ON
By None
Current price: $145.95


By None
Public Procurement in the European Union: How Contracting Authorities Can Improve Their Procurement Performance in Tende: How Contracting Authorities Can Improve Their Procurement Performance in Tenders in Ottawa, ON
Current price: $145.95
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Size: Paperback
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Alexander Rhode investigates performance-oriented measures of Contracting Authorities in public tenders conducted within the EU. He finds that Contracting Authorities can improve their performance and attract more suppliers by publishing (as precise as possible) starting prices in the beginning of a tender. First, he reports that compared with private-sector negotiations, starting prices do not create entry barriers in public procurement. Second, he finds that increased numerical precision of starting prices is linearly correlated with better performance and a higher number of bids. In public procurement, suppliers tend to attribute increased credibility to precise starting prices which reduces their (perceived) entry risks.
Alexander Rhode investigates performance-oriented measures of Contracting Authorities in public tenders conducted within the EU. He finds that Contracting Authorities can improve their performance and attract more suppliers by publishing (as precise as possible) starting prices in the beginning of a tender. First, he reports that compared with private-sector negotiations, starting prices do not create entry barriers in public procurement. Second, he finds that increased numerical precision of starting prices is linearly correlated with better performance and a higher number of bids. In public procurement, suppliers tend to attribute increased credibility to precise starting prices which reduces their (perceived) entry risks.

















