The purpose of this study is to analyze Union offensive operations during the Atlanta Campaign of the American Civil War with respect to the principle of the objective. This highly successful campaign split the Confederacy. Major General William T. Sherman led the Union army to victory over the Confederate army commanded first by Lieutenant General Joseph E. Johnston and later by Lieutenant General John B. Hood. The conduct of the campaign deep within the South featured herculean logistical achievements as well as brilliant tactics. Timed to coincide with operations in the Eastern theater, Sherman's parochial execution of his mission kept maximum pressure on the Confederacy. At no time could Johnston or Hood reinforce Lee in the Eastern theater, nor could Lee reinforce the Confederate army in the Western theater. The campaign ended on November 12, 1864 when Sherman, having pursued the elusive and highly mobile Confederates into Alabama, withdrew from contact. The problem in this study was to determine whether Sherman applied the principle of the objective prior to and subsequent to the capture of Atlanta. The primary source used for the study was the War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Confederate and Union Armies featuring copies of the original telegraph messages and correspondence. Sherman's private correspondence to his wife and to his brother in the U. S. Senate was also examined. | Atlanta Campaign by John G Coombs, Paperback | Indigo Chapters