This paper analyzes the problems inherent in the Defense Acquisition System as indicated in a sample of six studies conducted between 1986 and 2007. It explores the major legislation that developed the system since 1947 and identifies how much of this legislation served to complicate the system. Rather than fix its problems, this complexity served to thwart repeated attempts at centralization. Next, this paper evaluates two types of alternative acquisition structures developed by Congress and the department to compensate for inefficiencies in the core system: rapid acquisition processes and the granting of service-like acquisition authority to the United States Special Operations Command. It identifies the shift toward joint operations that exacerbates existing inefficiencies in defense acquisition, demonstrating a need to alter fundamentally the current structure. The final section proposes that Congress and the Department of Defense alter the Defense Acquisition System from a service-centric, domain-based focus to a streamlined, joint, capabilities-based construct that consolidates responsibility for requirements, resources, and acquisition. This consolidation of authority will align the acquisition system closer to the warfighter and provide the increased accountability lacking in the current structure. | Finishing The Work Of Goldwater-nichols by Daniel A Devoe, Paperback | Indigo Chapters